Hamilton v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43510 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-30-2015
Hamilton v. State of Idaho, Department of
Transportation Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43510
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Hamilton v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43510" (2015). Not Reported. 2734.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2734
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PA TRICK GLEN HAMILTON, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Docket Number No. 43510 
VS. 
State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Nez Perce regarding a judicial review of an ALS hearing officer 
decision. 
The Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-9516 
Attorneys for Appellant 
EDWIN L. LITTENEKER 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Drawer 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-0344 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED· OPY 
DEC 3 Q 2015 
peal&....:... 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
PATRICK GLEN HAMILTON, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Docket Number No. 43510 
vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Nez Perce regarding a judicial review of an ALS hearing officer 
decision. 
The Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-9516 
Attorneys for Appellant 
EDWIN L. LITTENEKER 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Drawer 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-0344 
Attorneys for Respondent 
I. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Contents ........................................................ i 
IL Table of Cases and Authorities ........................................... i-iii 
III. Statement of the Case ..................................................... 1 
IV. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding .................................. 3 
V. Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................ 6 
VI. Argument .............................................................. 7 
VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
II. 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Atwood v. State C?fidaho, Department of Transportation, 155 Idaho 884, 318 P.3d 653 (Ct. App. 
2014) ....................................................................... 1 
Bell v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d. 1030 (2011) ...... 3, 24 
Bennett v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 147 Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 
2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................................. 2 
Burton v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho at 749,240 P.3d 933 (ID.App 
2010) ............................................................... 17-18, 25 
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) ................ 17 
Cobb, 132 Idaho 198,969 P.2d 247 ............................................... 21 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d. 660,667 (1976);10, 13 
Dnif.fell v. State Department of Transportation, 136 Id. 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002) ............ 1 
Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 153 Id. 200,280 P.3d 703 (2012) ........ 1 
Hern v. Idaho Transportation Department, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42287 ........ 12, 29 
Gibbar v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 
2006) ..................................................................... 2, 3 
Ewing v. Idaho Transportation Department, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42599 ......... 29 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2D 569(2015) ........... 16, 17 
L. Chen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89, 41 S.CT. 298 .................................. 17 
Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 177, 560 P.2d 497, 499 (1997) ........................ 21 
Leavitt v. Craven, 154 Idaho, 661, at p. 667,302 P.3d 1 Idaho (2012) .................... 14 
Afahurin v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 140 Id. 65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004) ... 2 
Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department, 137 Id. 337, 48 P.3d 666 (2002) ............ 3 
State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552, 6 P.3d 408 (Ct. App. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . .. 111 
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927) ....................................... 27, 28 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561-916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).... . ...... 10, 13 
State v.Bitt,118 Idaho 584, 585-586, 798 P.2d 43, 45-44 (1990) ..................... 21 
State v. Brooks, 157 Idaho 890,341 P.3d 1259 (Ct. App. 2014) ......................... 10 
State v. Case, Court Appeals 2015, Opinion No. 82 . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... 20 
State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881,341 P.3d 598 (Ct. App. 2014) ......................... 25 
State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 703, 89 P.2d 197,201 (1939) ........................... 28 
State v. Devault, 131 Idaho 559, 61 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001) .................................... 21 
Statev.Ellias, 157Idaho511,337P.3d670(20l4)........... . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
State v. Ferreira, 131 Idaho 474-483, 988 P.2d 700-709 (Ct. App. 1999) .............. 10, 13 
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205-208, 953 P.2d 645-644, (Ct. App. 1998) . . . . . . . . ..... 10, 13 
State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257,335 P.3d 597 (Idaho App. 2014) ...................... 21 
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
State v. Hamilton, Nez Perce County Case No. CR 2014-7158 ......................... 13 
State v. Keith, 2015 Opinion No. 82, filed December 9, 2015 .......................... 19 
State v. Koivu, 272 P.3d 483, 152 Idaho 511 (Idaho 2012) .......................... 26, 28 
State v. Martin, 141 Idaho 31,218 P.3d 10 (Idaho App. 2009) .................... 18, 24, 26 
State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319-312, 756 P.2d. 1083-1085 (Ct. App. 1988) ............. 10 
State v. 1\1orris, 41933, February 18, 2015, 2015 WL 668871 (Idaho App. 2015) .......... 13 
State v. Neal, 215 Westlaw 74, 24812 (November 23, 2015) ........................ 12, 21 
State v. Neal, 41534, October 15, 2014, Westlaw 515426 (Ct. App. 2014) ............. 12-13 
State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 97 P.3d 479, (Ct. App 2004) ......................... 19 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) . . . . . . ............ 26 
State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 .................................................... 28 
State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d, 1279 (Ct. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
United States v. Cortez, 449 US 411-417, 101 S.Ct. 690-695, 66 L.Ed.2d. 621, 628 (1981) 10, 13 
United States v. Leon, ......................................................... 26 
Wanner v. State, 151 Id. 164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011) .................................. 3 
Wheeler v. Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 374,223 P.3d 761 (Ct App. 2009) at p. 383.10 
Williams v. State, 155 Idaho 380,283 P.3d 127 (Ct. App. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17 
Statutes and other Authorities Page 
J.C. § 18-6608 ............................................................... 19 
J.C. §18-8002 ............................................................... 25 
I.C. § l 8-8002A ....................................................... 2, 3, 24, 30 
LC. §18-8002A(7) .......................................................... 2, 22 
LC. §18-8002A(7)(a) ..................................................... 6, 7, 16 
ii 
§49-201 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 3 
§49-236(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 11,1 
I.C. §49-330 .................................................................. 3 
LC. §49-401B(6) ............................................................. 11 
LC. §49-426 ................................................................. 14 
LC. §49-426(2) ................................................................ 8 
LC. §49-426(3) ................................................................ 8 
LC. §49-428 ................................................. 10, 14, 18, 21-22, 25 
LC. §49-428(2) .............................................................. 4-7 
I.C.§49-431 ................................................................. 14 
I.C. §49-432 ................................................................. 14 
J.C. §49-443 .............................................................. 14, 25 
I.C. §49-443(1) ................................................................ 9 
J.C. §49-443(4) ................................................... 3-13, 18-22, 25 
LC. §49-456 ....................................................... 14, 19, 23, 25 
J.C. §49-456(1) ...................................... 5-9, 11-16, 18-19, 21-22, 24-26 
J.C. §49-456(2) ............................................................. 8, 12 
J.C. §49-630(1) ............................................................... 12 
J.C. §49-637(1) ............................................................... 12 
J.C. §49-808(1) ............................................................... 18 
I.C. §49-808 ................................................................. 25 
LC. §49-902 ................................................................. 19 
I.C. §49-1627 ............................................................... 19 
I.C. §67-5201(2) ............................................................... 3 
LC. §67-5270 ................................................................. 3 
LC. §67-5277 ................................................................. 2 
J.C. §67-5279(1) .............................................................. 2 
LC. §67-5279(3) .................................................... 1-3, 23, 29, 30 
I.C. §67-5279(3)(d) ............................................................ 2 
I.A.R. 9(23) ................................................................. 15 
I.LR. 9(15) .................................................................. 15 
I.LR. 9(16) .................................................................. 15 
I.LR. 9(b)(15) ................................................................. 8 
I.LR. 9(23) .................................................................. 15 
IDAPA Rule 04.11.01.415 .................................................. 22-24 
iii 
III. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Mr. Hamilton was given a driver's license suspension as a result of his 
failure of a breath test on September 7, 2014, pursuant to Idaho Code § l 8-8002A. There was a 
judicial review of the Idaho Transportation Department's hearing officer's decision upholding the 
license suspension of Mr. Hamilton. The license suspension began on October 7, 2015. 
Party Reference: The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as "ITD" or 
"Department" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Hamilton is referred to by name. Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services is referred to as "ISP" or "ISPFS." 
Standard of Review: InDruffellv. State Department ofTramportation, 136 Id. 853, 41 P.3d 
739 (2002), the Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the judicial 
reviews of administrative proceedings, the Court stated: 
"Under the IDAPA, the ITD's decision may be overturned only where its findings: 
a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; or c) arc arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. 
Section 67-5279(3). 
At p. 855. Sec also Atwood v. S'tate ofldaho, Department of Transportation, 155 Idaho 884, 318 
P.3d 653 (Ct. App. 2014) and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 153 Id. 200,280 
P.3d 703 (2012). 
Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing 
Officer that license suspension should be vacated. 1 The review of disputed issues of fact must be 
confined to the agency record for judicial review. LC. §67-5277. LC. §67-5279(1) sets out the scope 
ofreview. Bennett v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 147 Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. 
App. 2009). The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. Upon judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's order a Court may 
not set aside findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial evidence on the Record 
as a whole" I.C. §67-5279(3)(d). Afahurin v. State of Idaho, Department o.fTransportation, 140 Id. 
65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also Gibbar v. State(?( Idaho. Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 
937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006). The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act is: " ... if the agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed, 
1 (7) Administrative hearing on suspension .... The burden of proof shall be on the person requesting the hearing. The 
hearing officer shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alconol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 
18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances administered at the direction of the peace 
officer were not conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing 
equipment was not functioning properly when the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) 
of this section. 
If the hearing officer finds that the person has not met his burden of proof, he shall sustain the suspension. The hearing 
officer shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law on each issue and shall enter an order vacating or sustaining 
the suspension. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and order entered by the hearing officer shall be considered a 
final order pursuant to the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, except that motions for reconsideration of such 
order shall be allowed and new evidence can be submitted .... 
2 
unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is 
made upon unlmvful procedure, 1s not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious 
or an abuse of discretion. A1arshall v. Idaho Transportation Department, 137 Id. 337, 48 P.3d 666 
(2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a 
manner specified in I.C. §67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. 
Gibbar v. State()_{ Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Id. App. 
2006). 
A hearing pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed 
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative 
regulation is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id. 
164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011) at p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review 
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's 
license. See I.C. §§49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2). Bell v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d. 1030 (2011). 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDING 
Mr. Hamilton was stopped on September 6, 2014, in Lewiston, Idaho because of the 
following: " ... for improper registration sticker ( obstructive white color in lower right corner and 
red color sticker near the bottom edge near the middle, I.C. 49-443(4) ... " .. Exhibit to Clerk's 
Record at p. 6. 
3 
Mr. Hamilton submitted pictures to the hearing officer, one being the picture of his license 
plate as it existed at the time of the stop. Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 332. See also color pictures 
submitted as a result of the Objection to the Record. Pictures of another license plate were provided 
as evidence. Exhibits to Clerk's Record at pp. 329-331. These are picture of Mr. Ed Litteneker's 
license plates. Tr. at p. 14. Mr. Hamilton was stopped and was requested to take field sobriety tests. 
He was detained and asked to take a breath test. His breath test was noted as a .108 and .111 .. 
Exhibit to Clerk's Record at pp. 3-4. 
The hearing officer found: "Senior Trooper Talbott stopped the vehicle driven by Hamilton 
for having an improper registration sticker, a violation of Idaho Code §49-443(4)."2 Exhibit to 
Clerk's Record at p. 361. The hearing officer noted: "Even ifidaho Code §49-443( 4) is not an 
infraction traffic violation, Exhibit O shows Hamilton was still driving a motor vehicle in violation 
of this statute." Exhibit to Clerk's Record. at p. 362. The hearing officer also stated: "Idaho Code 
§49-428(2) clearly notes a vehicle is not properly registered if the registration sticker is not located 
') 
~ 49-443. LICENSE PLATES TO BE FURNISHED BY DEPARTMENT-- FORi\1 AND CONTENTS ... (4) License plates issued 
for vehicles required to be registered in accordance with the provisions of sections 49-402 and 49-402A. Idaho Code, shall be issued 
color coded red, white or blue registration validation stickers showing the year of registration. Each registration validation sticker 
shall bear a number from I through 12. which number shall correspond to the month of the calendar year in which the registration 
of the vehicle expires and shall be affixed to the lower right-hand corner of the plates within the outlined rectangular area. 
4 
,n-",H"'-' plate as set forth Idaho Code §49-443( 4). to Clerk's Record at p. 361. He 
also stated: "Hamilton was not only in violation ofldaho Code §49-443(4), he was also in violation 
ofldaho Code §49-428(2) when he placed the registration sticker in the incorrect area on the license 
plate.". Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 361. 
Mr. Hamilton was called as a witness to testify about his license plate. He was asked: 
"Q: Okay. So your license was properly registered for 2014? A: And 2015. Q: Right. And 2015. 
A: Correct." Exhibit to Clerk's Record, Tr. at p. 10, 11 12-16. The arresting officer did not testify as 
he avoided service of process regarding his subpoena. Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 333. The 
hearing was held on October 1, 2014. The hearing officer sustained a suspension. Exhibit to Clerk's 
Record at p. 358. A timely request for judicial review was requested. Exhibit to Clerk's Record at 
p. 3 82. The District Court heard the matter on May 18, 2015 and issued its decision on July 31, 
2015, . Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 102. A timely appeal was filed to the Supreme Court 
regarding issues of first impression about the interpretation ofldaho statutes J.C. §§49-428(2), 49-
443( 4) and 49-456(1 ). Is it a law violation to place a registration sticker near the small rectangle on 
the license plate instead of in the rectangle and whether this statutory scheme is vague. 
3 49-428. DISPLAY OF PLATE AND STICKERS. ( l) License plates assigned to a motor vehicle shall be attached, one (I) in the 
front and the other in the rear, ... License plates shall be displayed during the current registration year. The annual registration 
sticker for the current registration year shall be displayed on each license plate, except for trailers and semitrailers on extended 
registration under the provisions of section 49-434, Idaho Code. For the purposes of this title, the license plates together with the 
registration stickers shall be considered as license plates for the year designated on the registration sticker. 
(2) Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, 
be at a height not less than twelve ( 12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the plate, be in a place and position 
to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible, and all registration 
stickers shall be securely attached to the licenst: plates and shall be displayed as provided in section 49-443( 4 ), Idaho Code. 
5 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. There Was No Legal Cause to Stop Hamilton Pursuant to Idaho Code §18-
8002A(7)(a) 
B. The Statutes Are Vague: Idaho Code §§49-428(2). 49-443(4) and 49-456(1); Idaho 
Code Is Unconstitutionally Vague with Regard to the Application of Chapter 4, Title 
49 
C. The Requirement for Rulemaking with Regard to the Standard Operating Procedure 
Was Not Followed, Therefore, the Breath Test Was Invalid 
D. The Standard Operating Procedure in Existence at the Time of Mr. Hamilton's Stop 
Was Not Properly a Rule and Therefore the Breath Test Was Invalid. 
6 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THERE WAS NO LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP HAMILTON 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §18-8002A(7)(a) 
The hearing officer wrongly decided that Mr. Hamilton had an "improper registration 
sticker". There is nothing on the record that indicates that Mr. Hamilton's registration sticker was 
improper. In addition, there is nothing on this record that supports the hearing officer's statement 
that: "Idaho Code §49-428(2) clearly notes a vehicle is not properly registered if the registration 
sticker is not located on the license plate as set forth in Idaho Code §49-443( 4 )." Exhibit to Clerk's 
Record at p. 361. The hearing officer makes conclusionary statements but provides no analysis of 
the statute nor an analysis of any case law that supports what are clearly ill-informed points. There 
is nothing in the record that indicates that the registration document that was provided to the 
arresting officer was incorrect. There is nothing on this record to show that the license plate was not 
a current license plate. There is nothing about the registration sticker that indicates that it is out of 
date or fa! sified or that it is not a duly purchased registration sticker for 2014 - 2015. The fact that 
the registration sticker wasn't in the rectangle doesn't mean it was an "improper registration sticker" 
and it doesn't mean the vehicle wasn't properly registered. The license plate displayed the current 
registration sticker for the current registration year. 
The Court can easily see that the decision made by the hearing officer is flawed as Idaho 
Code §49-456(1) states as follows: 
7 
Violation of Registration Provisions. It shall be unlawful for any person: (1) To 
operate or for the owner to permit operation upon a highway of any motor 
vehicle, trailer or semitrailer which is not registered and which does not have 
attached and displayed the license plates assigned to it for the current registration 
year ... ( emphasis added as to what is underlined) 
If the Legislature had wanted there to be a law violation for the failure to place the sticker 
then the Legislature could have specifically set this out in LC. §49-456(1) as it did in LC. §49-
456(2), which reads: 
(2) To operate or for the owner to permit the operation on state and federal lands or 
upon highways, or sections of highways, as permitted under section 49-426(3) and 
( 4 ), Idaho Code, any all-terrain vehicle, utility type vehicle or motorbike that does not 
have a valid and properlv displaved restricted license plate issued pursuant to this 
chapter and attached registration sticker issued pursuant to section 67-7122, Idaho 
Code, subject to the exemptions allowed in section 49-426(2), Idaho Code. ( emphasis 
added) 
The Legislation was specific in subsection 2 about registration stickers for off road type 
vehicles. On this record, there is no evidence to support the hearing officer's finding that Trooper 
Talbott stopped the vehicle driven by Mr. Hamilton for having an "improper registration sticker" in 
violation of LC. §49-443(4). Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 361. Mr. Hamilton had a proper 
registration sticker on his license plate. 
The Idaho Infraction Rules don't indicate that I.C. §49-443( 4) is an infraction. See Idaho 
Infraction Rules, Rule 9(b )( 15)4, this rule is specific to license plates. 
4 Failure to display license plate. Section 49-428, Idaho Code. (Fixed penalty $10.50, court costs $16.50, county justice 
fund fee $5.00, peace officers training fee $15.00, court technology fund fee $10.00, and emergency surcharge fee 
$10.00) 
8 
Idaho Code §49-443(1) notes: " ... each license plate and registration sticker shall be treated 
with a fully reflectorized material according to specifications prescribed by the board." Mr. 
Hamilton had the required license plate and sticker on his vehicle. 
Mr. Hamilton's license plate was registered for the current year, 2014 - 2014. His license 
plate was securely fastened, was not less than twelve (12) inches from the ground and was 
maintained free of foreign material and in a condition to be clearly legible. The registration sticker 
was securely attached to Mr. Hamilton's license plate. The Legislature made it clear that placement 
of the license plate and the sticker was to make sure that they were legible for law enforcement's 
observation. There is no question in this case that the current registration sticker was clearly visible 
to Trooper Talbott. 
Failing to place the stickers in the rectangle area is not a law violation pursuant to LC. §49-
456(1 ). The legibility of the sticker and the securing of the license plate are what is deemed 
important by the Legislature. One could look at LC. §49-443( 4)5 and note that there is no 
requirement for the registration sticker to actually be legible. A registration sticker could be turned 
around with the color and the registration information facing the license plate as long as it was 
5
"DISPLA Y OF PLATE AND STICKERS. (l) License plates assigned to a motor vehicle shall be attached, one ( 1) in 
the front and the other in the rear... 
License plates shall be displayed during the cuJTent registration year. The annual registration sticker for the current 
registration year shall be displayed on each license plate, ... For the purposes of this title, the license plates together 
with the registration stickers shall be considered as license plates for the year designated on the registration sticker. 
(2) Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate 
from swinging, be at a height not less than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the plate, 
be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition 
to be clearly legible, and all registration stickers shall be securely attached to the license plates and shall be displayed 
as provided in section 49-443(4), Idaho Code. 
9 
in the lower right-hand corner of the plate; at least this is an argument that could be made 
based upon the literal reading of LC. §49-443(4). The Court can note that there is no requirement 
in J.C. §49-428 for the registration sticker to be legible. The statute specifically addresses the 
legibility of the license plate but not the sticker. 
Mr. Hamilton has the affirmative duty to show the trooper lacked legal cause to stop his 
vehicle. The Courts have routinely used the following standard: 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicles occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizures. De/ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d. 
660,667 (1976); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561-916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. 
App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to 
investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable 
suspension that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 US 411-417, 101 S.Ct. 690-695, 66 L.Ed.2d. 621, 628 (1981); State v. 
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205-208, 953 P.2d 645-644, (Ct. App. 1998). The 
reasonableness of the suspension must be evaluated upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 131 Idaho 474-483, 988 P.2d 
700-709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspension standard requires less than 
probable cause but more than more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of 
the officer. Id. An officer may draw a reasonable inferences from the facts in his or 
her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and 
law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319-312, 756 P.2d. 1083-
1085 (Ct. App. 1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct 
observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as 
normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128 Idaho at p. 561, 916 P.2d at 1286;" 
Wheeler v. Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 374,223 P.3d 761 (Ct App. 2009) at p. 383. See 
also State v. Brooks, 157 Idaho 890, 341 P.3d 1259 (Ct. App. 2014). 
The case law from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court rests on a vehicle 
being driven contrary to traffic laws. Mr. Hamilton's vehicle was not being driven in violation of 
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traffic noted that: "It is well-established in Idaho that when a police 
officer observes conduct which leads to the reasonable conclusion that 'criminal activity may be 
afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous' the officer is 
entitled to conduct a limited stop of the suspect." State v. Devault, 131 Idaho 559, 61 P.2d 641 (Ct. 
App. 1998). There is no evidence in this case that criminal activity was afoot. There is no evidence 
in this case that Mr. Hamilton had committed, or was about to commit, a criminal act. See State v. 
Anderson, 134 Idaho 552, 6 P.3d 408 (Ct. App. 2000). 
LC. §49-456(1) is clearly vvritten and having a registration sticker outside of the rectangle 
box is not noted as a violation of the registration provisions. In Mr. Hamilton's case, the District 
Court simply cited to LC. §49-443( 4) regarding the placement of the registration sticker in the lower 
right-hand corner of the plate and noted I.C. §49-236(2): "It is an infraction for any person to violate 
any of the provision of Chapter 3, 4 and 6 through 9 of this Title unless otherwise specifically 
provided." R. at p. 106. The District Court at no time discusses LC. §49-456(1 ). The District Court 
does not discuss the fact that jfl.C. §49-236(2) was applicable to Chapter 4; why did the Legislature 
in §49-401 B( 6) add: "A violation of the provisions of this section shall be an infraction" to the end 
of LC. §49-4018(6). The Legislature put in LC. §49-236(2), the language:" .... unless otherwise 
specifically provided." When someone reads the language: "Violation of Registration Provisions -
It shall be unlawful for any person: ... ", one would think that this language outlines the violations 
for registration provisions. I.C. §49-456(1) is the "unless otherwise specifically provided" for 
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4 motor registration section ofidaho Code. Why would the hearing officer 
discuss LC. §49-456(1) if it was not relevant to the issues regarding the legal cause to stop. The 
District Court simply ignored LC. §49-456(1 ). 
The District Court in Mr. Hamilton's case failed to recognize the requirement for interpreting 
all the relevant statutes in this case. The Supreme Court in State of Idaho v. Neal, 215 Westlaw 7 4, 
24812 (November 23, 2015) specifically stated, in dealing with the fog line issue: "Statutes must be 
construed as a whole without separating one provision from another. (Cite omitted) Language of a 
particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be 
construed together so as to determine the legislature's intent."Neal at p. . The Hamilton District 
Court Judge is the same judge that determined that the SOPs did not require rulemaking in Gary 
Alexander Hern v. Idaho Transportation Department, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42287. In the 
Neal case, the Idaho Supreme Court construed LC. §49-630(1) and §49-63 7(1 ). The District Court 
in Mr. Hamilton's case should have construed LC. §49-443(4) and J.C. §49-456(1). The District 
Court could have also looked at what the Legislature did with regard to registration stickers in LC. 
§49-456(2) as the Legislature was quite specific in addressing registration stickers. The District 
Court's analysis in Hamilton was too simplistic and failed to construe all of the statutes. 
When the Court determines that a criminal statute is ambiguous; the doctrine of Lenity 
applies and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. Even though this is an 
administrative license suspension matter, the Courts in Idaho consider this matter criminal in nature 
and therefore the doctrine of Lenity applies. State v. Neal, 41534, October 15, 2014, Westlaw 
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App. 201 The application §49-456(1) to I.C. §49-443(4) confuses what is 
unlawful. 
Mr. Hamilton vvas in substantial compliance with the intent of all three statutes noted above 
and could not possibly have knmvn that placing his current registration sticker at the location found 
in this case would be a violation of any particular law of the "State of Idaho. The magistrate in his 
DUI case made this determination. See State of Idaho v. Patrick Hamilton, Nez Perce County Case 
No. CR 2014-7158. The placement of the sticker is not a violation of the law according to the 
Legislature's mandate in I.C. §49-456(1 ). The State argued below: "Trooper Talbott stopped Mr. 
Hamilton's vehicle for improperly displayed registration stickers." (emphasis added) State's Brief, 
Rat p.77. No where on this record does it indicate that Mr. Hamilton's vehicle was stopped for a 
display ofimproper registration "stickers", plural. There is no evidence about the sticker on the front 
license plate. The only sticker at issue would be on the back license plate. 
In State v. A:Jorris, 41933, February 18, 2015, 2015 WL 668871 (Idaho App. 2015) the Court 
of Appeals noted; 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 
559,561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1?.86 (Ct. App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an 
officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic 
laws. United States v. Cortez, 449U.S.411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 
205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion 
must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State 
v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483,988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Opinion at p. 3 
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This case dealt with Mr. Morris' vehicle moving right and completely crossing over the solid 
,vhite line for two or three seconds. This case also dealt with the interpretation of a statute. The 
Court indicated that the plain language of the statute must be given effect without engaging in 
statutory instruction. It is Mr. Hamilton's position that LC. §49-456(1) is plain and unambiguous. 
The State noted below: "Unfortunately, the hearing examiner had a difficult time with Mr. 
Hamilton's argument as to the application of I.C. §49-456. Idaho Code §49-456(1 )is not helpful to 
determine whether the failure to comply with J.C. §49-428 and LC. §49-443 constitute a violation 
of law." State's Brief at p. 80. The State does not explain why this statement might be true. The 
State then cites to LC. §49-236(2), which states in pertinent part: "It is an infraction for any person 
to violate any of the provisions of chapters 3, 4 and 6 through 9 of this title unless otherwise 
specifically provided." State's Brief at p. 80. But the State's ignores the "unless otherwise 
specifically provided" language. The pertinent section of LC. §49-456(1) states: 
"VIOLA TIO NS OF REGISTRATION PROVISIONS. It shall be unlawful for any 
person: ( 1) To operate or for the owner to permit the operation upon a highway of 
any motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer which is not registered and which does not 
have attached and displayed the license plates assigned to it for the current 
registration year, subject to the exemptions allowed in sections 49-426, 49-431 and 
49-432, Idaho Code." 
The State fails to note for the Court that in Idaho, where more than one statute is related to the same 
subject, the statutes are in pari materia. The Courts in Idaho have determined: "When construing 
such statutes, 'the specific statute will control over the more general statute'." Leavitt v. Craven, 154 
Idaho, 661, at p. 667,302 P.3d 1 Idaho (2012). 
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addition, the have determined that the latest expression of the legislative will 
control. Idaho Code §49-456(1 ), was amended in 2009 and is found in the supplement to the Idaho 
Code while §49-236 is not. Therefore, LC. §49-456( I )is more specific and is the more recent statute. 
Subsection 1 is very clear about what is unlawful for any person regarding the violation of 
registration provisions. Idaho Code §49-456(1) could not be more specific. 
In this case, there is no indication that the Trooper had a search warrant or an arrest warrant 
and as the State has pointed out, an infraction is a civil public offense not constituting a crime. See 
State's Brief Rat p. 80. 
The State's references I.A.R. 9(23) in it's brief below. There is no such Rule. One will 
assume that the State meant Idaho Infraction Rule 9(23)6. However, once again the application of 
the more specific to the more general must be applied. In this case, the failure to display a license 
plate is an infraction as noted in I.LR. 9(15)7• Mr. Hamilton displayed his license plate. U.R. 9(16)8 
Operating a Vehicle Without Registration applies to J.C. §49-456. I.I.R. 9(23) does not apply. There 
is no law violation in Mr. Hamilton's case. 
6(23) Non-moving traffic infractions. (Fixed penalty $10.50, court costs $16.50, 
county justice fund fee $5.00, peace officers training fee $15.00, court technology fund fee $10.00, and emergency 
~urcharge fee $10.00) 
(15) Failure to display license plate. Section 49-428, Idaho Code. (Fixed penalty $10.50, court costs $16.50, county 
justice fund fee $5.00, peace officers training fee $15.00, court technology fund fee $10.00, and emergency surcharge 
ff,e $10.00). 
(16) Operating vehicle without registration. Section 49-456(1 ), Idaho Code. (Fixed penalty $44.50, court costs $16.50, 
county justice fund fee $5.00, peace officers training fee $15.00, court technology Fund fee $10.00, and emergency 
surcharge fee $10.00). 
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The hearing officer noted: if Idaho Code §49-443( 4) is not an infraction traffic 
violation, Exhibit O shows Hamilton was still driving a motor vehicle in violation of this statute." 
Exhibit to Clerk's Record at pp. 361-362. The hearing officer also noted: "Senior Trooper Talbott 
stopped the vehicle driven by Hamilton for having an improper registration sticker, a violation of 
Idaho Code §49-443(4)." Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 361. Mr. Hamilton had a proper 
registration sticker. 
Idaho Code §49-456(1) is specific to violation of registration provisions. One can only 
believe that the Legislature didn't want to give law enforcement the authority to pull citizens over 
for such silly circumstances as is found in Mr. Hamilton's case 
Trooper Talbott did not have legal cause to stop Mr. Hamilton's vehicle, thus a violation of 
Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A(7)(a). The hearing officer should have vacated the license 
suspension. 
B. 
THE ST A TUTES ARE VAGUE; 
IDAHO CODE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE \VITH 
REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 4, TITLE 49 
As the Court is aware, a statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or 
as applied to a complainant's conduct. Williams v. State, 155 Idaho 380, 283 P.3d 127 (Ct. App. 
2012) at p. 137. A recent Supreme Court case, Johnson v. US., 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) alters Idaho's 
case law requiring that a facial vagueness challenge show vagueness in all of the law's applications. 
The Johnson Court noted: 
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In all events, although statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest 
otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is 
constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the 
provision's grasp. For instance, we have deemed a law prohibiting grocers from 
charging an "unjust or unreasonable rate" void for vagueness even thought charging 
someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust and 
unreasonable. L. Chen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89, 41 S.CT. 298. We similarly 
have deemed void for vagueness a law prohibiting people on sidewalks from 
"conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by" -even though 
spitting in someone's face would surely be annoying. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 
611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971 ). These decisions refute any suggestions 
that the existence of some obviously risky crimes establishes the residual clause's 
constitutionality. 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2D 569 (2015) 
Due process requires that all be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and that 
persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. Id. at p. 136. The 
void for vagueness doctrine applies to statutes employing civil sanctions for violations. Williams v. 
State, supra, at p. 136. 
Mr. Hamilton begins with the challenge as applied which requires that a complainant show 
that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited 
or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such as the police had unbridled discretion in determining 
whether to charge the complainant. In Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746,240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010), 
the Court noted: 
"Accordingly the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, premised upon the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining criminal 
conduct or imposing civil sanctions [1] be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and the 
statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." ( cites omitted) 
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p. 748. 
It is that people of ordinary intelligence would not know that placing the registration 
sticker near the rectangled area was a law violation, there is not adequate notice considering what 
LC. §49-456(1 )states. LC. §49-428 seems to require that the license plate be legible and that the 
registration sticker be securely attached to the license plate. Mr. Litteneker, one could argue, has a 
common level of intelligence. Mr. Litteneker' s placement of his stickers was not completely in the 
rectangle. Exhibit to Clerk's Record at p. 329-331. 
There are no guidelines for law enforcement officers to govern how LC. §49-443(4) might 
be enforced. If someone has their registration sticker slightly outside of the rectangle, is that a law 
violation? How about 50% in the rectangle and 50% outside of the rectangle? If there is a showing 
of a prior registration sticker underneath the current registration sticker, is that a law violation? 
The Court in Burton v. State, supra, found vagueness in the language of LC. §49-808(1 ). In 
State v. A1artin, 141 Idaho 31, 218 P .3d 10 (Idaho App. 2009), the Court made it clear that due 
process cannot place someone in peril for the loss ofliberty because they needed to speculate on the 
meaning of penal statutes. At p. 35. Mr. Hamilton was not put on fair notice that his placement of 
the registration sticker would be a law violation. The lvfartin case dealt with a dangling license plate. 
The Court noted that common sense dictates that where a license plate is secured by only one bolt 
and hanging at angle, it is reasonable for an observer to suspect that it had not been fastened securely. 
Of course, the statute is very clear about fastening securely. Mr. Hamilton used a license plate frame 
to securely fasten his license plate, as do the majority of drivers in the State ofldaho. The District 
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in its discussion regarding the issue of vagueness, once again fails to look at LC. §49-456(1) 
in its analysis of the application of LC. §49-443(4). The Court of Appeals, has in past cases such 
as State v. Keith, 2015 Opinion No. 82, filed December 9, 2015, noted that neither party contended 
that the code section in question, LC. §49-1627, was ambiguous. The Court, in State v. Ellias, 157 
Idaho 511,337 P.3d 670 (2014) needed to interpret LC. §18-6608. In Ellias, the Supreme Court 
noted that neither party had asserted that LC. §18-6608 was ambiguous. Ellias at p. 514. Mr. 
Hamilton is raising ambiguity in his case. 
The District Court, in its decision in Hamilton, cited State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 97 
P.3d 479, (Ct. App 2004) to support its position. However, Patterson is not helpful as the District 
Court did not compare the statutory scheme used in Patterson which is the problem with its lack of 
analysis of LC. §49-456. The Court in Patterson stated: 
"If the legislature had intended to allow an exception for colors other than red, it 
could have included it in the statute. Instead, both section 49-906 and 49-910 refer 
to only the color red when discusses colors that may be admitted from taillights." 
At p. 615. 
The Patterson Court actually noted LC. §49-902 in its analysis of Mr. Patterson's argument. 
It might have been helpful for the District Court in Mr. Hamilton's case to actually address LC. §49-
456(1) and its application to the vagueness issue but the District Court choose to simply ignore this 
code section. I.C. §49-902, states the scope and effect with regard to the provisions of Chapter 9. 
Chapter 4 does not have such a statute at its beginning, however, Chapter 4 does have §49-456 that 
notes specifically what is unlawful with regard to registration provisions. 
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The Court can look at the State v. Case, (Court Appeals 2015, Opinion No. 82) decision 
vvhen it cites to State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P .3d, 1279 (Ct App. 2007) in which the Court 
rejected the State's argument that a mere presence of a temporary permit provided reasonable 
suspension to perform a stop. The Court noted: "To hold otherwise would allow law enforcement 
officers of this State unfettered discretion to stop each and every vehicle being operated with a 
temporary registration to 'investigate' its validity." The same could be said in Mr. Hamilton's case. 
What is the standard that is to be used as to how far the registration sticker might be outside the 
rectangle. There is no guidance. The magistrate in Mr. Hamilton's DUI case rejected the State's 
argument and suppressed the evidence because she found that the placement of the registration 
sticker in substantial compliance based on her analysis of the statutes involved in Chapter 4. This 
was appealed to the District Court and Judge Brudie declined to follow Judge Evan's analysis. The 
matter was remanded back and the prosecutor promptly offered an inattentive driving. 
Counsel for Mr. Hamilton walked through the parking lot of the Supreme Court building 
when he was there for oral argument on November 24, 2015. There were vehicles in the parking lot 
that are not in compliance with LC. §49-443( 4). There was a Jeep with a Boise Broncos license plate 
cover that blocks the registration sticker. There was a GMC with a Harley Davidson frame that has 
the license plate numbe ith the registration sticker in the upper right-hand comer. There 
were other vehicles that had the registration stickers totally covered by their frames, which is 
probably the reason the GMC owner placed the registration sticker in the upper-right hand comer 
as the Harley frame covered the rectangle for the most part. 
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Court stated citing to v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 177,560 P.2d 497, 499 
(1997): 
"Courts should presume that a statute was not enacted to work a hardship or to effect 
an oppressive result. Constructions that would render the statute productive of 
unnecessarily harsh consequences are to be avoided. Accordingly, any ambiguity in 
a statute should be resolved in favor of a reasonable operation of the law." 
Neal, 215 Westlaw 74, 24812, Opinion at p. __ . 
The Court in State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257,335 P.3d 597 (Idaho App. 2014) stated that: "A 
void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test 
will be applied where a statute imposes a criminal penalty. Cobb, 132 Idaho 198, 969 P .2d 24 7" at 
p. _. The Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, should provide more protection it Idaho 
citizens than the Federal Constitution. See State v. Donato, 135 [daho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001). 
Considering the application of the three statutes: §§49-428, 49-443(4) and 49-456(1), one 
would be hard pressed to really know that placing a registration sticker in a location near the 
rectangle box would somehmv be a violation that would allow a driver to be stopped for legal cause 
of criminal activity. One wonders when this sort of unregulated or unbridled discretion on the part 
of law enforcement is going to be put to an end. 
It is necessary that "laws provide sufficient standards to those who will enforce them." State 
v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585-586, 798 P.2d 43, 45-44 (1990). A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen,judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. The statutes in question 
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provide no guidelines 
law enforcement officers. 
enforcement whatsoever and as such, enforcement is totally subjective to 
The statutory schemes ofl.C. §§ 49-428, 49-443( 4) and 49-456(1) are poorly drafted and fail 
to provide any objective standards which a person of common intelligence could rely upon in 
determining whether their conduct was a violation of law. The three statutes , LC. §§49-428, 49-
443( 4) and 49-456(1 ), keep people guessing as to what is criminal activity. 
In this case, Mr. Hamilton was in substantial compliance with Chapter 4 Title 49. LC. §49-
456(1) does not notify a driver that the placement of the sticker outside the rectangle would be a law 
violation. There was no legal cause to allow Mr. Hamilton to be pulled over based on the record 
before the Court. It must be remembered that hearing officers cannot make decisions regarding 
constitutional challenges to statutes. See ID APA Rule 04.11.01.415. 
In this case, the State below argued the standard of review as follows: 
"Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the 
hearing officer that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or was 
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-
8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or; 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or 
other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, 
Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment 
was not functioning properly when the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
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testing as required in subsection (2) of this section." 
State's Brief, Rat 74-75. 
The State told the District Court that the hearing officer can only make a decision on these 
five factors. None of the five factors deal with whether a non-lawyer, non-judge, can make 
constitutional decisions. Idaho Code §67-5279(3) specifically requires that the District Court make 
determinations regarding constitutional issues. 
In addition, the State ignores IDAP A Rule 04.11.01.415. IDAP A Rule 04.11.01.415 states 
in pertinent part: "CHALLENGES TO STATUTES (RULE 415). A hearing officer in a contested 
case has no authority to declare a statute unconstitutional." At no time would it have been productive 
for Mr. Hamilton to argue a constitutional challenge to a hearing officer in an administrative license 
suspension case. However, Mr. Hamilton did make an argument regarding vagueness to the ALS 
hearing officer. The argument was made to the hearing officer as follows: 
"And if you would somehow want to extrapolate out that somehow a failure to 
display a license plate could also include not putting the tab in the exact spot where 
the little white space, I would submit that that is a stretch and potentially would cause 
an argument to be made regarding vagueness. And if the statute and legislature 
wanted to make a violation for not placing the tab exactly where the little white spot 
is, it could have said that in 49-456, but it didn't say that." 
Exhibit to Clerk's Record, ALS Tr at p. 13 
This issue of vagueness was before the District Court on judicial review. Not only was the 
argument preserved; LC. §67-5279(3) only allows the District Court on review to hear issues of 
constitutionality. 
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The State cited to Bell v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P .3d. 
1030 (Ct. Apps. 2011) below. At no time did the Bell Court considered ID APA Rule 04.11.01.415. 
Also, Idaho Code § 18-8002 specifically has set out in it, that the Court can considered whether civil 
rights were violated. There is no such provision in I.C. § 18-8002A for ALS hearing officers. Mr. 
Hamilton did raise the issue of vagueness in front of the hearing officer. 
In State v. lvf artin, 141 Idaho 31, 218 P .3d 10 (Idaho App. 2009), the Court made it clear that 
due process cannot place someone in peril for loss of liberty because they need to speculate on the 
meaning of penal statutes. At p. 35. Based on I.C. §49-456(1 ), Mr. Hamilton was not placed on 
notice that placing his registration sticker outside the rectangle would be a crime. The State v. 
Martin holding does not apply to Mr. Hamilton's situation. Mr. Hamilton's registration sticker was 
securely fastened to his license plate. His license plate was clear for view; as was his registration 
sticker. 
The State argued in its brief that the hearing officer had a difficult time with Mr. Hamilton's 
argument as to the application ofI.C. §49-456(1 ). State's Brief, Rat p. 80. One would assume that 
the hearing officer had at least a common level of intelligence. One would assume that Mr. 
Litteneker has a common level of intelligence, however, his registration stickers are not in 
compliance with his version of how Idaho Code should be applied. The problem with the State's 
argument is that it totally disregards LC. §49-456(1) and its specific language. 
The cases cited by both the State and Mr. Hamilton require that persons of ordinary 
intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. In addition, there are no guidelines for 
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enforcement that the State has cited to, or the Counsel for Mr. Hamilton has been able to find, 
with regard to the application ofl.C. §49-443(4) by law enforcement. Is placing the sticker slightly 
outside the rectangle a crime? What is the standard for law enforcement? 
Cases that deal with LC. §49-808 really do not help the State in its argument regarding 
vagueness. Chapter 8, Title 49 does not have a comparable statute to LC. §49-456(1). The analysis 
of I.C. §49-808 only deals with the interpretation of one statute. Even the State admits that there are 
several statutes that are in play regarding the vagueness issue: I.C. §49-456, I.C. §49-428; I.C. §49-
443 and LC. §49-236(2). The State, in its brief below, cited to the Burton v. State of Idaho, 
Department ofTramportation, 149 Idaho at 749,240 P.3d 933 (ID.App 2010) and State v. Colvin, 
157 Idaho 881,341 P.3d 598 (Ct. App. 2014). Of course, the State gives no analysis as to how the 
Court came up with its decisions in Burton and Colvin. The Court in Colvin stated: 
"The trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. As noted in Burton, 
signaling is required in circumstances where there exists 'signage or other indicator 
that one lane was ending and the other surviving.' Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P .3d 
at 936." (Emphasis added.) In Burton, neither the sign nor the road configuration 
made clear which lane terminated. In Spies, the road configuration itself indicated 
which lane ended. In this case, the sign indicated which lane ended." 
State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881, 341 P.3d 598 (Ct. App. 2014) 
The Court of Appeals in Colvin did not answer the question about the vagueness of the 
statute. It simply indicated that Colvin contended the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The 
Court decided that there was signage noting that the lanes merged and Mr. Colvin clearly should 
have signaled. 
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State v. Martin, 140 Idaho 31, 218 P .3d 10 (Idaho App 2009), the Court did not considered 
the application of LC. §49-456(1) and therefore the application oflvfartin to Mr. Hamilton's case is 
inappropriate. 
In addition, the Idaho Constitution should provide more protection to Idaho citizen then the 
Federal Constitution. In State v. Koivu, 272 P.3d483, 152 Idaho 511 (Idaho 2012), this Court issued 
a thorough analysis of our constitution's search and seizure jurisprudence, and a comprehensive 
recitation of its relevant history. 152 Idaho 511 (2012 ). In Koivu, the State asked the Court to 
overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). Guzman rejected the state's invitation to apply the 
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. In analyzing the issue in Koivu, the Court began by 
providing a synopsis of the progression of the exclusionary rule within the Federal Constitution. 
Importantly, the Court explained that the U.S. Supreme Court's "view of the exclusionary rule ... 
changed [i]n Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), [where] the 
Court held that the exclusionary rule 'is not a personal constitutional right: nor is it 'calculated to 
redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure."' Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 at p. 
514. Next, the Court explained United States v. Leon, the case that the Court declined to follow in 
Guzman. "In Leon, the police had seized evidence acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant, 
but the warrant was later determined to have been issued without probable cause." Id. at 514-15. As 
a result, the U.S. Supreme Court "held that the exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence 
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant" because 
"the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of 
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and magistrates." Id. ( quotations omitted). The good-faith exception, the Court explained, was 
expanded to include reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes, an arrest pursuant to 
a "warrant" that the officer had no reason to know was quashed, and searches pursuant to precedents 
that were later overruled. Id. The reason in all of those cases was the same: exclusion would not 
advance the interest in deterring police misconduct. 
As the Court explained, however, that rationale is not as significant when interpreting Idaho's 
constitution. "In its decision[ in State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 ( 1927),] the [Idaho Supreme] Court 
made it clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply because it was 
obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. "ld. at 516 ( emphasis added). As the 
Arregui Court stated: 
A continued disregard of the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, and the principles thereof incorporated in state Constitutions, heads 
us directly to revolution against their usurpation, if history tells us correctly that 
violation of the rights sought to be protected thereby was one of the chief moving 
reasons for the Revolution. If, one by one, the rights guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution, can and must, for expediency's sake, be violated, abolished, stricken 
from that immortal document, and from state Constitutions, we will find ourselves 
governed by expediency, not laws or Constitutions, and the revolution will have 
come. 
I can see no such expediency or necessity for the enforcement of any law as to justify 
violation of constitutional rights to accomplish it. The shock to the sensibilities of 
the average citizen when his government violates a constitutional right of 
another is far more evil in its effect than the escape of any criminal through the 
courts' observance of those rights. 44 Idaho at 58 ( emphasis added). 
This principle was reiterated over a decade later, when the Court noted that the "rule is well 
settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's constitutional immunity from 
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seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded request for its suppression be timely 
" State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 703, 89 P.2d 197, 201 (1939). The principle was again 
reiterated in 1978: "The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, 
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by 
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of 
the land." State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586. Rauch and Arregui "held that there were reasons 
supporting the exclusionary rule other than deterring unconstitutional searches and seizures 
that the law enforcement officers did not reasonably believe were lawful." Koivu. 152 Idaho at 
518 ( emphasis added); see also. id. at 519 ("Idaho ha[ s] clearly developed an exclusionary rule as 
a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures in addition to other purposes 
behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a deterrent for police 
misconduct.") (emphasis added, quotations omitted). The Court in Hamilton can apply the Idaho 
State Constitution to provide protection that may not be found in the U.S. Constitution. 
The application of the statutory scheme is vague. Therefore the Court must determine that 
the suspension must be vacated. 
C. 
THE REQUIREMENT FOR RULEMAKING WITH REGARD 
TO THE ST AND ARD OPERA TING PROCEDURE \VAS NOT 
FOLLOWED, THEREFORE, THE BREA TH TEST WAS INVALID 
The record contains the e-mails that have been used in other cases regarding the lack of 
rulemaking. Exhibits to Clerk's Record, R at pp. 58-226. Mr. Hamilton's stop was made on 
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6, 14. The hearing officer notes that on September 201 ISP Forensic Services 
adopted the SOP into the IDAPA Rules. However, ISP does not have the ability to adopt anything 
into the IDAP A rules. There is a process that is set out that has been argued in other cases such as 
Jererny C. Ewing v. Idaho Transportation Department, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42599 and 
Gary Alexander Hern v. Idaho Transportation Department, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42287. 
The ID APA Rules regarding breath testing were not in effect at the time Mr. Hamilton was stopped 
and his breath test was taken. Therefore, the breath test must be rejected because the SOPs in 
existence at the time of Mr. Hamilton's stop were void. 
D. 
THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE IN EXISTENCE 
AT THE TIME OF MR. HAMIL TON'S STOP WERE NOT PROPERLY 
RULES AND THEREFORE THE BREATH TEST WAS INVALID. 
The issue of rule-making was addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court regarding two Kootenai 
County cases. It is submitted that the District Court, on judicial review, pursuant to LC. §67-
5279(3), is allowed to determine the issues raised by Mr. Hamilton is his judicial review regarding 
rule-making, the SOPs, and the validity of the breath test in Mr. Hamilton's case. See briefing in the 
Ewing case to support this issue in Mr. Hamilton's case. 
The State has not cited to anything that allows Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
(hereinafter: "ISP" or "ISPFS") to simply, on September 2, 2014, adopt the SOPs into ID APA Rules. 
The Court can note the current status of the IDAP A Rules regarding breath testing after the rule-
making process was completed. The Court can also go to ISP's website and note the frivolous 
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of SOP that occurred since September 2014. Change after frivolous change 
been made without any regard for rule-making, science or the like. ISPFS does whatever it likes 
and until an appellate court issues a decision, ISP will continue with its disregard of science and due 
process. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
ISPFS has failed to follow the statutory mandate of LC.§ 18-8002A regarding "rule" making 
and thus the breath testing system in Idaho fails. LC. §67-5279 mandates a reversal because this 
action of the agency was unconstitutional, was beyond statutory authority and was arbitrary. 
Additionally, there was no legal cause to stop Mr. Hamilton. The three statutes noted above when 
read together are vague. The Court must set aside the hearing officer's decision and send the matter 
back to the Department with instructions to set aside the suspension. 
DA TED this 28th day of December, 2015. 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
Char es M. S oschein, a member of the firm 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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